Transparency and opacity in battery revenues: We’re not making this stuff up... (but they might be)
Transparency
Much of the energy industry is backed by masses and masses of data – the physical operations of individual plants, the market participation of operators, the resultant clearing/trading prices of these services/markets. Much of this data is widely and publicly available and can be observed, downloaded, analysed and more-or-less picked apart with a fine-tooth comb.
Through the NESO Data Portal, one can extract the market results for Ancillary Services (DFR, BR, QR, etc.) and some physical properties of the UK energy system (e.g. system frequency). Day-ahead trading market prices can be observed via the Epex Spot website, and services exist that collate historical data for almost all energy trading markets such that a full historical view of prices can be gleaned. The Balancing Mechanism Reporting Service (BMRS) portal from Elexon offers an in-depth view of Balancing Mechanism (BM) activity – the physical actions of BM participants & their instructions from the BM. The EMR Delivery Portal publishes a view of Capacity Market prequalifications and agreements. Again, multiple services exist that can be used to extract further market prices (e.g. BM accepted Bid/Offer prices) and activity to paint a reasonably accurate picture of any one participant’s actions at almost any given time in the past.
From this, one may conclude that market activity is transparent. However …
Opacity
Where service revenues can be reliably extracted for BM, Dynamic Frequency Response (DFR), Balancing Reserve (BR), Quick Reserve (QR) and Capacity Market (CM) – trading revenues can only be inferred based on the physical activity of a battery. The published Physical Notification (PN) data on BMRS details the intended charge and discharge power, per half-hour, in addition to any BM Bid/Offer instructions issued to a battery. These PNs can be explained by an array of actions (e.g. state of charge rebalancing while delivering DFR) but essentially represent trading activity – a negative PN implies a buy, and a positive, a sell. Current market trends indicate that around 80% of a grid scale batteries revenue comes from wholesale markets/trading. But how accurately can trading revenues be reported, unless explicitly published by the trader themselves? Herein lies the opacity in battery revenues!
An initial view can be taken by applying the Epex or Nord Pool day-ahead (hourly resolution) prices against all PN positions. This can be a fair assumption as the majority of battery trading activity will go through these markets. Inaccuracies can arise, however, when a half-hourly position is declared, as clearly that kind of activity could not be attributed to a market that trades at an hourly resolution. With this, one could take an average (or volume weighted average) of the intraday trading price and apply that to any half-hourly trades, leaving the hourly trades to day-ahead markets. This is a reasonable approach that covers most situations but, as good as it may be, is still a fairly broad assumption.
Complexity
This is because the inferred revenue can misrepresent the actual achieved revenue quite significantly. Take, for example, the trading market prices on January 22nd 2025; on this day, the system margin was forecast to be quite tight (the margin between supply and demand had a high likelihood of nearing Capacity Market Notice (CMN) trigger limits). As such, the day-ahead auction cleared at very high prices, the hour starting at 17:00 cleared at £620/MWh! As the day progressed, it became more apparent that system margin was well within limits (i.e. no CMN was triggered) and subsequently the intraday trading markets saw weighted average prices for the half hours starting 17:00 and 17:30 clearing at around £190/MWh and £210/MWh respectively.
If a 50MW (100MWh) battery, with a CM obligation of 13MW, secured day-ahead trades for 4 hours over the afternoon peak (a strategy to secure trading revenues over a potential CM event), for the hour starting 17:00 they would have earned £8,060 (13MW x £620/MWh x 1hour). If, as was the case, the day progressed without a CM event and they entered the evening peak period with a 75% state of charge, there would be 25MWh of remaining capacity that could be sold during the intraday market. If the strategy was to weight the volume sold by higher prices, and 3MW was sold at 17:00 for £190/MWh followed by 4MW for £210/MWh at 17:30, the total revenue for that hour would have come out to £8,765. However, externally, all that can be observed within the PN data is a position of 16MW for 17:00 and 17MW for 17:30, and with no other method to discern which market was traded, following the assumption that this was performed in intraday is the best guess. This would result in a revenue of £3,305 for that hour, less than 40% of the true value.
Of course, this is an extreme example - price swings of £400/MWh are not frequent between day-ahead and intraday trading markets. But, it does indicate that estimated trading revenues based on PN declarations become far less accurate when intermarket prices become more volatile – and this doesn’t even consider non-physical trading where, in the example above, it would have been possible to buy back the full volume of the day-ahead trades in the intraday market for a profit in all settlement periods, submitting PNs of zero for the entire 4 hour period – leading to an observable revenue of £0.
Battery revenues are complex, covering multiple markets, limitations and operator strategies. A lot of clarity can be gathered from the available data provided in public industry sources, but the finer details and intricacies of potentially the largest share of battery revenues – wholesale trading – are very difficult to extract!
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